sâmbătă, 30 iulie 2011

Despre servetele celebre

Care ar putea fi diferenta dintre un servetel banal genul de unica folosinta si un servetel celebru ?

Unii spun ca modelul face diferenta adica bulinutele, dotarile parfumate, dimensiunea sau poate pretul, altii spun ca utilitatea marginala este cea mai importanta si ca la produsele tip convenience chiar absenta, adica lipsa servetelului la momentul oportun ridica unele neajunsuri…mai mici sau mai mari in functie de moment

Totusi, cand este celebru un servetel ?  inainte de folosire cand este nou si frumos sau dupa folosire cand probabil este oarecum folosit, sifonat si purtator de urme  ?

Pai depinde cine cand si cum l-a folosit J))

Oricum, cred ca unul dintre servetelele celebre de pe net este servetelul pe care a fost desenata prima data curba Laffer, banuiesc ca un servetel impecabil, alb, satinat si complet reutilizabil, varianta de restaurant de clasa… J))


The story of how the Laffer Curve got its name
begins with a 1978 article by Jude Wanniski in The
Public Interest entitled, “Taxes, Revenues, and the
‘Laffer Curve.’”1 As recounted by Wanniski (associate
editor of The Wall Street Journal at the time), in
December 1974, he had dinner with me (then professor
at the University of Chicago), Donald Rumsfeld
(Chief of Staff to President Gerald Ford), and
Dick Cheney (Rumsfeld’s deputy and my former
classmate at Yale) at the Two Continents Restaurant
at the Washington Hotel in Washington, D.C. While
discussing President Ford’s “WIN” (Whip Inflation
Now) proposal for tax increases, I supposedly
grabbed my napkin and a pen and sketched a curve
on the napkin illustrating the trade-off between tax
rates and tax revenues. Wanniski named the trade-off
“The Laffer Curve.”
I personally do not remember the details of that
evening, but Wanniski’s version could well be true.
I used the so-called Laffer Curve all the time in my
classes and with anyone else who would listen to
me to illustrate the trade-off between tax rates and
tax revenues. My only question about Wanniski’s
version of the story is that the restaurant used cloth
napkins and my mother had raised me not to desecrate
nice things.

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at:
www.heritage.org/research/taxes/bg1765.cfm
Produced by the Thomas A. Roe Institute
for Economic Policy Studies
Published by The Heritage Foundation

214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.
Washington, DC 20002–4999
(202) 546-4400 heritage.org

Am cautat pe net  servetelul respectiv insa se pare ca nu prea e fotogenic si cu toata celebritatea de moment, pentru istorie, a ramas doar curba de pe el J

Curba Laffer asa cum am gasit-o pe net, e un graphic foarte destept, sugestiv, simplu de desenat si foarte simplu de inteles si face legatura dintre nivelul taxelor ca procent si suma care se poate colecta la bugetul statului.

Astfel, curba Laffer identifica un maxim al taxelor pe care le poate colecta sistemul din motive obiective.
Urmarind curba Laffer observam pe prima portiune cum cresterea taxelor reprezinta si cresterea sumelor colectate la buget dupa care, odata cu atingerea punctului de maxim orice crestere a taxelor reprezinta de fapt o scadere accelerate a sumelor colectate de sistem.

Bineinteles, pe langa aspectele pure de teorie economica in practica mai apare un element subiectiv care face, ca la orice crestere a taxelor, piata sa reactioneze negativ in orice punct de pe curba Laffer.
Suplimentar, acelasi factor subiectiv apare si in varianta scaderii taxelor existand un prag de sensibilitate specific fiecarei piete in parte peste care incep sa apara efectele positive generate de scaderea taxelor.

Justificarea teoretica este strans legata de identificarea pe curba Laffer a unor aspecte strict aritmetice dar si a unui mecanism economic ale carui efecte sunt divergente unui rationament pagubos de genul “taxe multe si mari si sistem cat mai stufos si ambiguu”.


Datorita importantei si efectelor pe termen lung si chiar la nivel istoric ale politicii fiscale originea istorica a curbei Laffer poate fi gasita la ganditori economici din cei mai diversi.
Astfel, Ibn Khaldun un filozof musulman din secolul 14 aprecia in cartea sa Muqaddimah ca “taxele mici colectate de la o mare masa de platitori” ar fi mai sanatoase, iar J.M. Keynes facea o paralela intre sistemul de taxe care are pierderi si o firma care are pierderi la care solutia recuperarii pierderilor a fost cresterea pretului de vanzare generand vanzari mai mici si implicit o ineficienta mai mare odata cu intrare sigura pe o spirala falimentara.

Totusi, dovezile cele mai clare ale oportunitatii scaderii taxelor ca masura anticriza (o consecinta a curbei Laffer) sunt rezultatele reducerilor de taxe aplicate de Administratia Americana in momente dificile din punct de vedere economic.

Astfel, in 1924 reducerea de taxe HARDING-COOLIDGE avut ca rezultat cresterea veniturilor la rezerva federala de la -9.2% la 0.1%, cresterea GDP de la 2% la 3.4% si scaderea somajului de la 6.5% la 3.1%.
In 1964, reducerea de taxe J.F. KENNEDY a avut ca rezultat cresterea veniturilor la rezerva federala de la 2.6% la 9%, cresterea GDP de la 4.6% la 5.1% si scaderea somajului de la 5.8% la 3.9%, iar ca valoare a rezultat o crestere a veniturior anuale la rezerva de stat de la 72 bil USD la 113 bil USD in patru ani.

In 1981, reducerea de taxe REAGAN a avut ca rezultat cresterea veniturilor la rezerva federala de la -2.6% la 3.5%, cresterea GDP de la 0.9% la 4.8% si scaderea somajului de la 7.6% la 7.8%, iar ca valoare a rezultat o crestere a veniturilor anuale la rezerva de stat de la 344 bil USD la 434 bil USD in patru ani.

Si cu toate ca multi tremura cand vine vorba de reduceri de taxe, avand in vedere periodicitatea reformelor de taxe si situatia economica actuala, probabil lista va continua cu numele unui presedinte mai recent ….

Bineinteles, asta daca nu cumva descopera intre timp ca prin aplicarea vreunui system de management inovativ si performant si in domeniul fiscal pot obtine plusuri de 10% la buget pastrand doar doua taxe: impozitul pe profit si taxa pe valoare adaugata J)))





vineri, 22 iulie 2011

continuare

The theory that increasing investment in building and machinery is the fundamental determinant of growth was disproved by Nobel Laureate Robert Solow as early as 1956. Moreover, Domar, complaining of an ever-guilty conscience, admitted in 1957 that his theory made no sense for long-run growth and instead endorsed Solow's growth theory. Solow argued that technological change is the only source of sustained growth. He showed that as capital per worker increases, the marginal productivity of capital declines until the capital-labor ratio approaches a steady-state level. At that point, savings are just sufficient to replace worn out machines and equip new workers (assuming population growth), so productivity growth is zero. It is technological progress that increases the supply of "effective" labor, thus keeping the capital-labor ratio going and preventing the decline of marginal returns to capital.

The belief that investment was the key to growth affected not only international institutions and U.S. foreign policy, but domestic policy as well. Two major forms of goverment intervention inducing businesses to expand the level of their outlays for plant and machinery were added to the tax code: accelerated depreciation deductions were introduced in 1954 and significantly expanded in 1981 and the investment tax credit was added in 1962. The latter was repealed in the tax reform of 1986, but accelerated depreciation deductions are still considered important for economic growth and are very significant in terms of tax revenue forgone.

More recently, The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 allowed taxpayers to deduct 30% of the cost of capital assets in their first year. The President Bush said: "this new law will provide tax incentives for companies to expand and create jobs by investing in plant and equipment".

Completare:

Procentul de deducere a valorii activelor din primul an modificat in 2002 la 30% a fost crescut la 50% in 2003, probabil au constatat ca au ceva rezultate :))))

Da, in principiu cred ca autorul articolului are dreptate, amortizarea accelerata nu este ea singura un panaceu pentru cresterea economica insa, cred ca avind in completare deducerea in proportie cat mai mare a valorii activelor (spre 100% :)))) inca din primul an ar putea da o mana de ajutor la cresterea economica si creearea de locuri de munca sustinind ideea de crestere economica generata atat de investitii in fabrici si echipamente dar si de cercetare si dezvoltare tehnologica.
Concept de bun simt, simplu si verificat.

joi, 21 iulie 2011

Cateva idei despre economie dintr-un articol de pe net

Not a panacea for economic growth: the case of accelerated depreciation Yoram Margalioth*

Un articol super tare cu o recapitulare a teoriilor economice inventate si aplicate mai ales in America de Nord.


Cred ca l-am gasit la un search legat de depreciere, ma intrebam cine si cand a inventat deprecierea/amortizarea, ce reprezinta din punct de vedere economic, contabil, fiscal si bineinteles managerial si de ce este nevoie de ea...... probabil contabilii au aflat asta de mult :))))

Oricum, cred ca dpdv managerial putem privi deprecierea/amortizarea doar ca o masura absolut orientativa si grosiera a evolutiei valorii activelor in timp, asta cu implicatii doar asupra valorii firmei la modul general si deloc ca un element de deducere a unor cheltuieli deja efectuate de firma.

Introducerea mecanismului de depreciere/amortizare are ca rezultat cresterea artificiala a profitului impozabil, astfel deprecierea fiind doar o alta taxa care taxeaza altceva decat profitul real, costul real al unui activ "amortizat" in 20 de ani fiind exorbitant.

De exemplu, pentru un activ de 200.000lei amortizat normal in 20 de ani, amortizarea anuala ar fi 10000 lei/an, iar sumele platite suplimentar la impozitul pe profit ar fi de 304.000 lei (+150%) astfel costul real al activului devenind 504.000lei.

cert este ca inca mai caut cine a inventat deprecierea si cine a aplicato prima data :)))) din punct de vedere fiscal...


INTRODUCTION*

Accelerated depreciation deductions have been a tenet of US tax policy for the past fifty years. They are widely believed to promote economic growth. In this paper, I argue that accelerated depreciation is based on a questionable economic growth theory and suggest switching to a depreciation method that is closer to economic depreciation. This may allow lowering tax rates or increasing tax incentives to research and development- the real engine of economic growth.

Accelerated depreciation policy can be traced back to an influential 1953 paper by Evsey Domar. In The Case for Accelerated Depreciation, Domar argued that "given the choice between a lower tax rate with normal depreciation, or a higher rate with accelerated depreciation, I would except in severe inflation, certainly recommend later". Domar's policy advice was based on a theory he developed in 1946 paper, known as the Harrod-Domar model, predicting that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was proportional to the number of machines; namely, that investment is the key to growth.